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Every federal system is structured by a federal constitution that
divides power, establishes central institutions, prescribes the rules for
resolving disputes, safeguards rights, and provides a procedure for its
own alteration. In some federal systems, the federal constitution
prescribes the political institutions and processes for the country's
constituent units as well, thus furnishing the constitutional architecture
for the entire federal system.' This is the case in Belgium and Canada,
for example. But in most federal systems, the federal constitution is an
"incomplete" framework document in that it does not prescribe all
constitutional processes and arrangements. Rather, it leaves "space" in
the federal system's constitutional architecture to be filled by the
constitutions of its sub-national units, even while it sets parameters
within which those units are permitted to act.4 However, those federal
systems that recognize a place for sub-national constitutions differ
markedly in the extent to which the federal constitution is incomplete,
that is, in the amount of space that they allocate to constituent units to
define their own goals and establish their own governmental institutions
1. Research on this article was conducted while the author was a Fulbright scholar
in Ottawa, Canada, and he wishes to acknowledge the generous support of the Fulbright
Program. However, the views expressed in the Article are those of the author alone and
do not represent the views of the Fulbright Program. Several scholars have shared their
insights with me, including Michael Burgess, John Dinan, Sebastien Grammond, Jacob
Levy, Aman McLeod, and Robert Williams. An earlier version of this paper was
delivered at McGill University, and I benefited from the scholarly exchange there as well.
A somewhat different version of this paper comprises part of the Introduction to
CONSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: SUB-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES
(Michael L. Burgess & G. Alan Tarr eds., forthcoming).
2. Distinguished Professor, Department of Political Science; Director, Center for
State Constitutional Studies, Rutgers University, Camden.
3. The use of the term "sub-national" is intended to distinguish the constitutions of
component units in federal systems from the constitution of the nation state. The author
recognizes that many federal systems contain various nationalities, or "nations," within
them.
4. Donald S. Lutz, The United States Constitution as Incomplete Text, 496 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 23, 26 (1988); Donald S. Lutz, From Covenant to
Constitution in American Political Thought, PUBLIUS, Fall 1980, at 10 1-02.
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and processes.s In previous research, I have focused on the range of
discretion ("constitutional space") available to constituent units in
designing their constitutional arrangements and on how the boundaries of
that space are policed.6 In this article, I extend the inquiry into sub-
national constitutional space to consider what factors influence the scope
of sub-national constitutional space in various federal systems, why sub-
national units have occupied or failed to occupy the constitutional space
available to them, and what consequences sub-national constitutionalism
has had on horizontal and vertical relations within federal systems.7
5. Sub-national constitutional space would seem to include, though it might not be
limited to, the following:
a. the power to draft a constitution
b. the power to amend that constitution
c. the power to replace that constitution
d. the power to set goals of government
f. the power to define the rights that the constituent unit will protect
g. the power to structure the governmental institutions of the constituent unit,
including whether the legislature shall be bicameral or unicameral
h. the power to define the process by which law is enacted in the constituent
unit
i. the power to create offices
j. the power to divide powers among the governmental institutions of the
constituent unit
k. he power to determine the mode of selection for public officials of the
constituent unit
1. the power to determine the term of office and the mode of and bases for
removal of officials of the constituent unit prior to the completion of their
term of office
m. the power to establish an official language
n. the power to institute mechanisms of direct democracy
o. the power to create and structure local government
p. the power to determine who are citizens of the constituent unit
q. the power to establish qualifications for voting for officials of the
constituent unit
6. See G. Alan Tarr, Sub-national Constitutional Space: An Agenda for Research
(unpublished paper delivered at the VIIth World Congress of the International
Association of Constitutional Law), available at http://camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/
workshop 11 greece07/workshop 11 /Tarr.pdf.
7. This paper focuses on the legal role of sub-national constitutions as independent
sources of law. But this is not their only importance. Sub-national constitutions may
serve important political purposes, regardless of the contents of the documents. They
may be instruments of conflict management during periods of political stability, and the
process of sub-national constitution-making itself may contribute to political
socialization. For an insightful discussion of how events in South Africa served these
purposes, see Jonathan L. Marshfield, Authorizing Subnational Constitutions in
Transitional Federal States: South Africa, Democracy, and the KwaZulu-Natal
Constitution, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585-638 (2008). This also occurred in the
Sudan. See Christina Murray & Catherine Maywald, Subnational Constitution-Making in
Southern Sudan, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 1203, 1204-05, 1232-33 (2006).
Sub-national constitutions may also be important as vehicles for making political
statements about the character of the federation. See, for example, the quasi-
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FACTORS AFFECTING THE SCOPE OF SUB-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
SPACE
If the scope of sub-national constitutional space varies among
federal systems (and sometimes even within federal systems), what
produces this variation? Several factors might be expected to influence
the scope of sub-national constitutional space. The process by which the
federal system was created could be one such factor. Scholars
distinguish between federal systems that were created by uniting pre-
existing political entities, referring to them as aggregative or coming-
together federations, and those created by the transformation of a
previously unitary political system, referring to them as devolutionary or
holding-together federations. Admittedly, this dichotomy
oversimplifies, as there are federations whose formation has involved
both aggregative and devolutionary processes. For example, the Swiss
Federation was formed by the merger of preexisting political societies,
but the subsequent creation of the canton of Jura could be seen as
devolutionary. Similarly, the thirteen original states of the United States
came together to form a federation, but subsequent states were carved out
of the territory of a preexisting federation. Despite these caveats, the
distinction remains useful.
One would expect that aggregative federal systems would be likely
to allow more sub-national constitutional space than would devolutionary
federal systems. In part, this would simply be the product of historical
context or pre-coming-together realities. When political units form a
federation, they already have in place their own institutions and political
practices, and attempts to interfere with them or to prescribe unnecessary
uniformities might threaten the process of federation. For example, the
drafters of the United States Constitution allowed each state to determine
voting qualifications within its borders for federal elections rather than
risk opposition to a federal mandate of uniformity in this sensitive area.9
In addition, one would expect that the federalizing political units would
seek to retain self-rule to the extent consistent with achieving the ends
constitutional Bill 99 enacted by the National Assembly of Quebec in 2000. Sub-national
constitutions may also be drafted in order to differentiate the constituent unit from other
units within the federation-i.e., as a way of emphasizing asymmetry. Note that this is
likely not a comprehensive list of the political functions of sub-national constitutions and
sub-national constitution-drafting, and that those who devise a sub-national constitution
may be divided as to the purposes the constitution is designed to serve.
8. See RONALD L. WATTS, COMPARING FEDERAL SYSTEMS (3d ed. 2008); Peter
Pemthaler, Asymmetric -Federalism as a Comprehensive Framework of Regional
Autonomy, in HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL COUNTRIES 2002 472, 472 (Forum of Federations
ed., 2002); Alfred Stephan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model, J.
DEMOCRACY 19 (Oct. 1999).
9. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
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that of federation. This likewise suggests maintenance of broad
constitutional space. Prospective constituent units might also demand
concessions expanding or safeguarding sub-national constitutional space
as the price for joining the federation. For example, several southern
states threatened not to join the American Union unless states were free
to determine their own law with regard to slavery. And in Ethiopia, the
Oromo Liberation Front agreed to cease armed resistance and join the
Ethiopian Federation only after the constituent states were guaranteed the
right to secede. o Finally, as a matter of constitutional design,
aggregative federal systems are more likely to lodge residual powers in
the constituent units rather than the federal government, and this may
also lead to broader sub-national constitutional space.
One would expect the dynamics to be quite different in
devolutionary federations. The national authority would be unlikely to
surrender powers beyond those necessary to achieve the ends of
federation. Moreover, because constituent units are being created rather
than pre-existing, they typically would not have the same ability to make
demands about the scope of sub-national constitutional space as would
pre-existing political entities. Often they would lack a strong political
identity-sometimes intentionally so. When South Africa created its
nine provinces, for example, it split the provinces that had constituted the
original Union of South Africa, incorporated the homelands established
by the apartheid government, and drew provincial boundaries so that
most provinces were ethnically heterogeneous, which dissipated the
power of ethnically-based political groups." Similarly, the states in
India did not exist, except as administrative units in a unitary state, until
the adoption of the Indian Constitution. 12 Finally, in contrast to
aggregative federal systems, devolutionary systems are likely to lodge
residual powers in the federal government, thereby circumscribing the
powers-including constitution-making powers-of the constituent
units.
Another factor that might influence the scope of sub-national
10. See Yonatan Tesfaye Fessha, Institutional Recognition and Accommodation of
Ethnic Diversity: Federalism in South Africa and Ethiopia 425-31 (June 9, 2008)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of the Western Cape), available at
http://etd.uwc.ac.za/usrfiles/modules/etd/docs/etd gen8Srv25Nme4_5952 1262639555.p
df; see also ETH. CONST. art. 39. This right cannot be curtailed even in emergency
situations. ETH. CONST. art. 93(4)c.
11. Fessha, supra note 10, at 244.
12. Under British colonial rule, India did have some administrative divisions, with
the colonial creation of provinces for administrative purposes and the recognition of 562
princely states. See Akhtar Majeed, Republic of India, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS,
STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 181-82 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Tarr
eds., 2005).
[Vol. 115:41136
2011] EXPLAINING SUB-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL SPACE
constitutional space is whether the federation has a system of
symmetrical or asymmetrical federalism. In a symmetrical federal
system, all constituent units have the same powers of self-government,
but in an asymmetrical system one or more constituent units are vested
with special or greater self-governing powers. Federations typically
create asymmetrical arrangements to "take account of the fact that within
a state there are significant cultural or societal differences among the
constituent units."' 3 This is particularly important when there are groups
who desire a degree of autonomy but are destined to be permanently in
the minority at the national level. Incorporating asymmetrical elements
may reduce the conflict that this could produce by allowing minorities
concentrated in particular constituent units a greater measure of self-rule,
thereby wedding them more closely to the federation. This greater self-
rule would likely have constitutional dimensions, so recognizing the
diversity that led to the asymmetrical arrangement in the first place
would usually require extensive sub-national constitutional space. Yet it
may be difficult to limit such self-rule to the distinctive constituent units
within the federation. Other constituent units might well resent the
"privileges" that are given-think, for instance, of the reaction of the
Rest of Canada to the claims of Quebec-and demand the same
opportunity for self-rule, a conversion from asymmetry to symmetry.14
But whatever the eventual outcome, one would expect that there would
be broader sub-national constitutional space in asymmetrical federations.
A further factor affecting the scope of sub-national constitutional
space might be the purposes underlying federation. Some federations-
such as Switzerland, Nigeria, and Belgium, as well as quasi-federations
such as Spain-were designed to recognize and accommodate the multi-
ethnic character of the population and provide space for the expression of
diversities. One would expect in such instances that the constituent units
would largely correspond with the diversities within the population and
that the federation would accord broad constitutional space to the
constituent units. This expectation is only partially borne out: although
constituent units do mirror the political saliency of ethnicity in the
federations, neither Belgium nor Nigeria has sub-national constitutions,
and Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain have only autonomy
statutes. Some federations established to accommodate a multi-ethnic
population, such as Switzerland, provide broad sub-national
constitutional space, but others, such as Malaysia, do not. In those that
13. STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM 188 (2004).
14. See Eduardo J. Ruiz Vieytez, Federalism, Sub-national Constitutional
Arrangements, and the Protection of Minorities in Spain, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL
CONsTITUTIONs, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 135, 149 (G. Alan Tarr, et al. eds., 2004).
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do not, greater representation in the councils of the federal government
often substitutes for self-rule.
Finally, some federations or quasi-federations have been designed
to deemphasize the ethnic or religious divisions in the society and
replace fragmentation with national solidarity and a common national
identity. In such federations, broad sub-national constitutional space
may be seen as a threat to national unity, particularly if (as in India) the
boundaries of current constituent units reflect the language groupings
within the population. Thus, it is hardly surprising that in India and
South Africa, two prime examples of multi-ethnic federations committed
to forging a common national identity, there is little sub-national
constitutional space, and the national governments are authorized to
invade even those powers that the federal constitution gives exclusively
to the constituent units when necessary to serve the purposes of national
economic unity, national security, and the need for national uniformity. 5
Most federations are not focused primarily on dealing with ethnic or
religious diversity. Some countries, such as Argentina, Brazil, and the
United States, have embraced federalism primarily as a way to govern
more effectively large geographic expanses.16  In such circumstances,
one might expect that constituent units would be granted broad
constitutional space in order to permit locally appropriate responses to
diverse conditions. Other countries, such as Austria and Germany, have
embraced federalism as a way to promote administrative efficiency, with
the constituent units having primary responsibility for implementing
federal policy." James Gardner has argued that this sort of cooperative
federalism "is largely incompatible with sub-national constitutionalism,"
in that it understands "Land governments as agents of the central
government in areas of national competence" rather than as polities with
their own political identities.18  Whether or not one agrees with this
judgment, one would expect that such federations would emphasize
concurrent rather than exclusive powers and accord their constituent
units very limited constitutional space.
These expectations are only partially fulfilled. Whereas the
American states do have broad constitutional space, the same is not true
for constituent units in Argentina and Brazil. In Brazil, despite the
marked socioeconomic diversity among the constituent units, the very
15. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, Ch. 4, § 44(2); INDIA CONST. arts. 249-50.
16. One might include Canada in this list, but it would be a controversial inclusion,
as Canadians disagree about the basic character and purposes of Canadian federalism.
17. See Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGB1 No. 1/1930, arts.
102, 1, & 103, T 1 (Austria).
18. James A. Gardner, In Search of Sub-National Constitutionalism, 4 EuR. CONST.
L. REv. 325, 333 (2008).
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detailed 1988 Constitution and judicial rulings have virtually eliminated
state experimentation in constitution-making.19  On the other hand,
although the homogeneity clauses in the German and Austrian
constitutions and their emphasis on concurrent powers have limited
constitutional experimentation in the Ldnder, they have not foreclosed it.
Since the beginning of the 1980s, the Austrian Ldnder have revised their
constitutions to incorporate more elements of direct democracy, identify
goals for state activity, and expand controls over the use of public
funds. 2 0 German Lander likewise have adopted constitutional provisions
for referenda, and since the late 1980s, they have, following the lead of
Schleswig Holstein, also revised their constitutions to identify goals for
state activity and expand protections for social rights.2' Some of this
"constitutionalizing" of policy goals may arguably exceed the
constitutional space available to the Ldnder-for example, the protection
given by the Brandenburg and Berlin constitutions to "permanent forms
of common living arrangements" other than marriage, and
Brandenburg's committing the Land to working to return military bases
to civilian use.22 Nonetheless, the developments in Austria and Germany
suggest that cooperative federalism does not necessarily preclude
significant use of sub-national constitutional space.
THE USE OF SUB-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL SPACE
If law defines the formal constraints on sub-national constitutional
space, the question remains as to what extent constituent units occupy-
or fail to occupy-the constitutional space allotted to them. Four general
points should be made at the outset. First, determining whether or not
constituent units have made use of the constitutional space available to
them is somewhat tricky. To do so, one might look for differences
between sub-national constitutions and the federal constitution, as well as
for differences among sub-national constitutions within a federal system.
Such differences would indicate that the constituent units had in fact
considered alternative constitutional arrangements rather than
thoughtlessly copying provisions enshrined in the federal constitution or
in the constitutions of other constituent units. However, this approach is
not foolproof. Constituent units may seriously consider alternatives to
19. Celina Souza, Federal Republic of Brazil, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS,
STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES, supra note 12, at 85.
20. Peter Bussjaeger, Sub-national Constitutions and the Federal Constitution in
Austria: A Case Study, 6-7 (unpublished paper, on file with author).
21. Arthur B. Gunlicks, Land Constitutions in Germany, PUBLIUS, Fall 1998, at 111-
12.
22. VERF. BRANDENBURG, arts. 26, 2 & 40, 5; see generally Gunlicks, supra note
21, at 120-24.
2011]1 1139
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
what is found in the constitutions of other constituent units or in the
federal constitution but conclude that there is no reason to diverge from
those models. A constituent unit's identical constitutional arrangement
does not necessarily mean the unit has failed to occupy the available
constitutional space, because the constitution-makers may have made a
conscious choice rather than merely copying what they found.
Second, occupying constitutional space is not an either/or
proposition: constituent units may make use of some, but not all, of the
space available to them. For example, John Dinan's comparative
analysis of institutional innovation in sub-national constitution-making
found little divergence from national constitutions with regard to
presidentialism and parliamentarism. 2 3 However, he discovered that sub-
national constitutions in several federations were easier to amend than
their federal counterparts, that many provided more opportunities for
direct democratic participation, and that many had over time instituted
unicameral legislatures, despite bicameral federal legislatures.24
Third, constituent units within the same federation may vary in the
use they make of the constitutional space available to them, and this
variation may occur in both symmetrical and asymmetrical federal
systems. The structure of American state constitutions illustrates this.
These constitutions differ dramatically in their length and detail-the
Alabama Constitution is more than 26 times longer than Vermont's; in
their frequency of amendment-the Alabama Constitution has been
amended more than 700 times, but the New Hampshire Constitution
fewer than 40; in their durability or frequency of revision-Louisiana has
had 11 constitutions, but 19 states have had only 1; and in their
contents.2 5
Fourth, political factors-ranging from the prevailing political ideas
of the era to the nature of the party system to the level of dominance of a
particular party throughout the country to the nature of popular demands
upon sub-national governments-ultimately determine the use of sub-
national constitutional space. Let us explore these political factors in
greater detail.
The willingness of constituent units to occupy the constitutional
space allotted to them may turn in part on timing. That is to say, the
similarities and differences among sub-national constitutions, as well as
their similarity to or divergence from the federal constitution, may reflect
the political era in which they were written. Because different sets of
23. John Dinan, Patterns of Subnational Constitutionalism in Federal Countries, 39
RUTGERS L.J. 837, 853-56 (2008).
24. Id.
25. G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6-27 (1998); COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, BOOK OF THE STATES 2008 10, table 1.1 (2008).
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political ideas tend to be dominant at various points in time, sub-national
constitutions are likely to reflect the reigning ideas of the era in which
they were written.26 American state constitutions demonstrate this point.
During the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Americans viewed
state legislatures as voicing the popular will and concentrated power in
them.27 Later in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, because of
public distrust of the fidelity and probity of state legislators, state
constitution-makers imposed numerous constitutional restrictions on
legislative power, augmented executive and judicial powers, inserted
policy pronouncements directly into state constitutions so as to foreclose
legislation, and expanded the use of direct democracy.2 8 During the
twentieth century, the concern shifted to enhancing the ability of
government to address the new problems confronting the states, and thus
state constitutions adopted during that period sought to streamline
government and remove barriers to effective action.2 9 And during the
late twentieth century states began to reimpose restrictions on state
legislatures, setting limits on the growth of state revenues, requiring
super-majorities for tax increases, imposing term limits on legislators,
and so on.3 0 So, the periods in which states adopted their constitutions
influenced the constitutions' contents, and this variation itself testifies to
states' use of the constitutional space available to them.
This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. Arthur
Gunlicks has identified a similar pattern in constitution making in the
German Ldnder.32 The Land constitutions that preceded the adoption of
the German Basic Law tended to include "the whole array of political
and social provisions, including basic human rights."33 Those drafted
after the adoption of the Basic Law focused on organizational principles,
because social concerns and rights guarantees had already been dealt
with in the Basic Law. Finally, the Ldnder constitutions drafted since
26. There is an alternative version of this as well. Sometimes constituent units use
their sub-national constitutions to preserve what has been jettisoned at the national level.
In the United States, for example, controls over liquor were maintained even after the
federal government rejected prohibition with the ratification of the Twenty-first
Amendment. In addition, state courts have interpreted state constitutions to maintain
substantive due process after its repudiation by the U.S. Supreme Court and has
recognized rights claims, such as the requirement of public funding for abortions, after
the Supreme Court rejected such claims as a matter of federal constitutional law.
27. See TARR, supra note 25, at 82-90.
28. See id. at 109-21.
29. See id at 150-57.
30. See id. at 157-61.
31. See id. at 60-172.
32. See generally Gunlicks, supra note 21.
33. Arthur B. Gunlicks, State (Land) Constitutions in Germany, 31 RUTGERs L.J.
971, 981 (2000).
2011]1 1141
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
1990 have reflected "modem values," seeking to guide political practice
through the inclusion of social rights and state goals.34
Yet, in order for changing political ideas to encourage constituent
units to make use of the constitutional space available to them, there
must be some time lag between the adoption of the federal constitution
and the adoption of its sub-national counterparts in order for a shift in
political ideas to take place. In many federations this is simply not the
case, either because the federation is of relatively recent origin (e.g.,
Russia and South Africa) or because the federation has adopted a new
constitution in the recent past (e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, and
Switzerland). Also, insofar as the federal constitution can be revised
with relative ease, the federation may itself respond to changing political
ideas with constitutional amendments, thereby keeping the federal
charter "up-to-date" and reducing the need for sub-national constitutions
to take the lead in pioneering new directions. On the other hand, if the
federal constitution is substantially more difficult to change than the sub-
national constitution, then even if the two constitutions were adopted at
the same time, over time their contents are likely to diverge. This may
have broader implications as well, as the frequency or infrequency of
constitutional change may affect how political actors view the
constitutions that are amended or revised. In the United States, for
example, the infrequency of formal constitutional change at the national
level has imbued the federal Constitution with a sense of untouchability,
of being above politics, whereas the frequency of amendment at the state
level has encouraged the public to view changes in state constitutions as
merely part of "normal politics." 3 5
A further factor encouraging constituent units to occupy the
constitutional space available to them may be regional differences
reflecting distinctive political or legal cultures or traditions, sometimes
linked to ethnic diversity. Daniel Elazar identified regional differences
in political culture in the United States and demonstrated how they have
influenced American state constitutions.3 6 Much greater diversity can be
found in many other federations, and this can lead constituent units either
to enshrine their residents' distinctive culture in their constitutions or to
provide additional protections to ethnic minorities situated within their
borders. These efforts to occupy constitutional space may involve
matters such as the official language of the constituent unit, as in
Ethiopia, or the language rights of minority populations, as in Germany,
34. Gunlicks, supra note 21, at 111-12.
35. See CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES
AND HISTORICAL PATTERNS (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996).
36. DANIEL ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 18-22 (1987); see generally, DANIEL
ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES (3d ed. 1984).
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or the rights of native peoples concentrated in the state, as in Mexico.3 7
Sometimes a single change at the sub-national level may precipitate
other changes as well. This is particularly likely when the establishment
of new avenues for sub-national constitutional change empowers groups
who had previously been stymied. A prime example is the addition of
mechanisms of direct democracy to sub-national constitutions. The
availability of this new avenue of change may enable groups who were
relatively ineffective in other arenas to pursue their objectives, thereby
opening up the possibility of a succession of constitutional amendments.
More generally, the more numerous the mechanisms for instituting
constitutional change, the more likely such change is to occur, and thus
the more likely that constituent units will occupy the constitutional space
available to them.
Finally, the distribution of political forces within the federation
affects the likelihood that constituent units will occupy the political space
available to them by creating either incentives or disincentives for
political mobilization for sub-national constitutional change. If the party
that is in control at the national level is in control within the various
constituent units, then it is more likely that constitutional reform will be
pursued at the national level or that constituent units will model their
constitutions on the federal charter. While the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) held power both nationally and within the
Mexican states, centralization of power was the norm, and federalism
and sub-national constitutions were largely ignored. Insofar as there was
significant constitutional change, it was concentrated at the national
level: from 1917-2000, there were 400 amendments to the federal
constitution. Conversely, if political parties that are in political
opposition at the national level control the governments of some
constituent units, they will likely make use of that political control to
advance their own agenda, and this may include constitutional
innovations in the space available to them. Thus, when Progressives
gained control of the California government in the early part of the
twentieth century, they constitutionalized a number of reforms that were
anathema to the more conservative Republicans who dominated the
37. On Ethiopia, see Fessha, supra note 10, at 399-406; on Germany and the
protection of language rights of minorities within particular Lander, see Norman Weiss,
The Protection of Minorities in a Federal State, in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 80-83 (G. Alan Tarr, et al. eds., 2004); and on
Mexico, where the Oaxaca Constitution extended protections for native people before the
federal constitution did, see Juan Marcos Guti6rrez Gonzdlez, United Mexican States, in
CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINAL, STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN FEDERAL COUNTRIES 209, 214
(G. Alan Tarr, et al. eds., 2005).
38. Gonzalez, supra note 37, at 233.
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federal government.39 More recently, faced with a conservative U.S.
Supreme Court, American state courts have interpreted their state
declarations of rights to provide greater constitutional protections than
were available under the federal charter.40
It also may be that the existence of strong national political parties
discourages distinctive initiatives from constituent units, reducing their
interest in occupying the constitutional space available to them. Indeed,
some constituent units may make deliberate, rational choices not to
occupy fully the space legally allotted to them. South Africa provides a
particularly telling example of this. The African National Congress, as a
matter of party policy, mandated that the provincial governments it
controlled should not draft provincial constitutions; the result has been
that only Western Cape Province now has a provincial constitution.41
One could speculate that, conversely, the existence of regional or
ethnically based parties might have the opposite effect.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OF SUB-NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL
SPACE
Dissenting in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,42 Justice Louis
Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court noted that "it is one of the happy
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, without risk to the rest of the
country."4 3 Brandeis's underlying assumption was that a multiplicity of
policy experiments would be more likely to discover good public policy
than would a single effort. If the experiment in one constituent unit
failed, the damage would be confined to a single jurisdiction. But if it
succeeded, then other jurisdictions could emulate the successful
experiment in their own law and public policy. Brandeis's depiction of
states as the laboratories of democracy has been endlessly repeated by
39. For discussion of these reforms, see SPENCER C. OLIN, JR., CALIFORNIA'S
PRODIGAL SONS: HIRAM JOHNSON AND THE PROGRESSIVES 1911-1917 (1968).
40. On this so-called "new judicial federalism," see G. Alan Tarr, The Past and
Future of the New Judicial Federalism, PUBLIUS, Spring 1994, at 63-79. For a valuable
comparative assessment, see generally Celine Fercot, Diversity of Constitutional Rights
in Federal Systems: A Comparative Analysis of German, American, and Swiss Law, 4
EUR. CONST. L. REv. 302 (2008).
41. See Rassie Malherbe & Dirk Brand, South Africa: Sub-National Constitutional
Law, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUB-NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1, 1 (Andre Alen, et al. eds., 2001).
42. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
43. Id. at 311. For a discussion of Justice Brandeis's argument, see A.E. Dick
Howard, Does Federalism Secure or Undermine Rights?, in FEDERALISM AND RIGHTS 11,
11-25 (Ellis Katz & G. Alan Tar reds., 1996). On the problematic roots of Justice
Brandeis's idea, see G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federalism,
and Scientific Management, PUBLIUS, Winter 2001, at 37.
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proponents of federalism and has spawned a rich literature documenting
the diffusion of innovations within federations." Our inquiry into the
consequences of constituent units occupying their sub-national
constitutional space can be understood as a sub-category within that
literature. Thus, much of what has already been written about policy
diffusion in federal systems also applies to the diffusion of sub-national
constitutional innovations. Let us highlight a few points about the
horizontal and vertical diffusion of sub-national constitutional
innovations.
Existing sub-national constitutions serve as models, either positive
or negative, for constitution-makers in other constituent units. This is
hardly surprising. The practice of drawing upon or copying provisions
reflects, in part, a respect for the efforts of earlier constitution-makers.
In describing the evolution of American state constitutions, Willard
Hurst explained: "There was a sort of stare decisis about this making of
constitutions; it was altogether natural in a country in which men moved
about readily taking with them the learning and institutions of their
former homes." 4 5 This willingness to draw upon the experience of other
states is enhanced by the recognition that constituent units face common
constitutional and policy problems. Particularly, in symmetrical federal
systems, the constituent units share the same powers and confront the
same policy concerns, and so they tend to be open to what has worked in
other constituent units.
Although Brandeis's focus was on the United States, sub-national
constitutional borrowing is not confined to a single country. For
example, Peter Quint has documented that similar borrowing occurred as
part of sub-national constitution making during German reunification:
Even the most modest of these new state constitutions reflect the
lessons of the GDR past and the 1989 revolution, and-with all their
similarities to the Basic Law-can still be said to represent a
distinctly different, and distinctly eastern, constitutional
consciousness. One important question of future constitutional
development in Germany is the extent to which the consciousness ...
may ultimately make its way, through constitutional revision or
judicial interpretation, into the constitutional consciousness of the
44. For studies focusing on the United States, see Jack L. Walker, The Diffusion of
Innovations Among the American States, 63 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 880 (1969); Robert L.
Savage, Diffusion Research Traditions and the Spread of Policy Innovation in a Federal
System, PUBLIUs, Fall 1985, at 1; Virginia Gray, Competition, Emulation, and Policy
Innovation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 230, 230 (Lawrence C. Dodd &
Calvin Jillson eds., 1994).
45. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS
224-25 (1950).
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unified nation and the west itself.46
Indeed, there is even evidence that borrowing of constitutional
innovations may on occasion extend beyond the borders of a single
federation. For example, the initiative and referendum provisions added
to the Oregon Constitution in 1902 were based on an idea of direct
democracy reflected in the constitutions of the cantons of Switzerland.4 7
Yet if commonalities among constituent units encourage borrowing
of constitutional provisions, it seems equally likely that differences
among constituent units may discourage such borrowing. Put differently,
insofar as conditions and values differ within a federation, it is less likely
that constituent units will emulate the sub-national constitutional
innovations pioneered in "different" units. Thus, when constituent units
are organized to reflect differences within the population of a federation,
those differences-and any attempts to give them constitutional
expression-may lead to the creation of distinctive constitutional
arrangements that are only appropriate within the particular unit. Also, if
some constituent units within an asymmetrical federal system have
greater constitutional space than do others, then again that will retard the
diffusion of constitutional innovations, because some units might not
have the authority to follow the path taken by units with greater powers.
When constituent units occupy the constitutional space available to
them, this may also affect constitutional politics at the federal level,
because the process of imitation and emulation can work vertically as
well as horizontally. Our analysis here focuses on the United States, but
presumably it has broader application as well. State constitutional
provisions played an important part in drafting the United States
Constitution, as the framers both borrowed ideas from state
constitutions-for example, the President was modeled quite closely on
the governor of New York-and rejected state constitutional experiments
that they found misguided-for example, the power of citizens to
"instruct" their representatives.4 8 State constitutional provisions also
influenced the federal Bill of Rights. 49 And since the founding, both
46. PETER E. QUINT, THE IMPERFECT UNION: CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES OF
GERMAN UNIFICATION 99 (1997). For a survey of judicial interpretations of the new
German Lander constitutions, see Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Guarantees of
Social Welfare in the Process of German Unification, 47 AM. J. CoMP. L. 303, 310-21,
325 (1999). See also Igna Markovitst, Reconcilable Differences: On Peter Quint's The
Imperfect Union, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 189, 194-97, 206-09 (1999).
47. David Schuman, The Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democracy: William
Simon URen and "The Oregon System, " 67 TEMP. L. REv. 947, 950 (1994).
48. See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, Experience Must Be Our Only Guide: The State
Constitutional Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 403 (1988).
49. Donald Lutz, The State Constitutional Pedigree of the U.S. Bill of Rights,
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federal statutes and amendments to the federal Constitution have drawn
upon state constitutional models. For example, the right to vote for
African-Americans, women, and eighteen-year-olds were pioneered in
state constitutions before their incorporation into the federal charter.so
So too were provisions guaranteeing equal protection of the laws,
banning poll taxes, and prohibiting the sale or use of alcohol.51 Thus,
one ironic consequence of this, one of the implications of Brandeis's
metaphor of the states as laboratories that is less frequently noted, is that
states occupying constitutional space with successful innovations may
encourage the federal government to adopt those innovations. But by
federalizing the issue, it may diminish the scope of sub-national
constitutional control.
The American experience also reveals that when states occupy the
constitutional space available to them, this can produce active avoidance
rather than emulation. This has occurred when states have sought to
occupy constitutional space by creating state constitutional rights broader
than what was available under the federal Constitution. A recent, highly
publicized example involved rulings by state supreme courts in
Massachusetts, California, Connecticut, and Iowa recognizing same-sex
marriage as mandated by their state constitutions. 52 Instead of emulation,
these rulings prompted actions by other states to prevent the diffusion of
these innovations and to preempt similar rulings within their own borders
by constitutionally prescribing that marriage is limited to male-female
couples. The rulings also prompted an unsuccessful effort to define
PUBLIUS, Sp.ing 1992, at 19.
50. See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED
HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
51. On equal protection, see generally Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 (1985); EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990). On poll taxes, see KEYSSAR,
supra note 50, at 262. On prohibition, see RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH
AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880-1920, 4
(1995).
52. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (this case consisted of six consolidated
appeals); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
53. States that have adopted constitutional amendments defining marriage as
between one male and one female include: Alabama (ALA. CONST., Amend. 774); Alaska
(ALASKA CONST. Art. 1, sec. 25); Arizona (ARIZ. CONST., Art. XXX); Arkansas (ARK.
CONST., Amend. 83); Colorado (COLO. CONST., Art. II, sec. 31); Florida (FLA. CONST.,
Art. I, sec. 27); Georgia (GA. CONST., Art. I, sec. 4): Hawaii (HAW. CONST., Art. I, sec.
23); Idaho (IDAHO CONST., Art. III, sec. 28); Kansas (KAN. CONST., Art. XV, sec. 16);
Kentucky (Ky. CONST., sec. 233A); Louisiana (LA. CONST., Art. XII, sec. 15); Michigan
(MICH. CONST., Art. I, sec. 25); Mississippi (MISS. CONST., Art. XIV, sec. 263A);
Missouri (Mo. CONST., Art. I, sec. 33); Montana (MONT. CONST., Art. XIII, sec. 7);
Nebraska (NEB. CONST., Art. I, sec. 29); North Dakota (N.D. CONST., Art. XI, sec. 28);
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marriage in the federal Constitution, which was an attempt to federalize
the issue not in order to follow the states' lead but in order to
circumscribe state constitutional space. 54
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Constitutions for constituent units that are drafted by those units and
that are separate from the federal constitution are a feature of most,
though not all, federations. This article is a preliminary synthesis of
what we know-and as implied by gaps in the analysis, what we do not
yet know-about these sub-national constitutions and their role in federal
systems. It identifies those factors that might influence the scope of the
constitutional space available to constituent units and the factors that
might affect the extent to which constituent units occupy-or fail to
occupy-the constitutional space available to them. It also considers
how sub-national constitutions both affect and are affected by the federal
system of which they are a component.
One tentative conclusion is that the constituent units of federations
often fail to occupy fully the constitutional space available to them.
They may refrain from developing sub-national constitutions altogether,
as in most provinces of South Africa. Even when they do devise
constitutions, they may proceed in lockstep with the federal constitution
or with the constitutions of other sub-national units, never considering
what political arrangements might be most appropriate for their time and
circumstances. If this is correct, it suggests that there may be unrealized
political opportunities in several federations. Constituent units may
provide greater opportunities for groups who are outnumbered nationally
to participate in politics, to have their rights recognized, and to advance
their common concerns. Contemporary trends point toward expanding
recognition and autonomy for groups in multilingual, multicultural,
multiethnic and multinational states, sometimes as the only alternative to
either political frustration or secession. Sub-national constitutionalism
can provide a way to respond to demands for recognition and self-rule.
Beyond that, this article is designed to show that analysis of sub-
national constitutions is essential for a full understanding of the
constitutional architecture of federal systems and that the sub-national
Ohio (OHIO CONST., Art. XV, sec. 11); Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST., Art. II, sec. 35);
Oregon (OR. CONST., Art. XV); South Carolina (S.C. CONST., Art. XVII, sec. 15); South
Dakota (S.D. CONST., Art. XXI, sec. 9); Tennessee (TENN. CONST., Art. XI, sec. 18);
Texas (TEX. CONST., Art. I, sec. 32); Utah (UTAH CONST., Art. 01); Virginia (VA. CONST.,
Art. I, sec. 15-A); and Wisconsin (WIs. CONST., Art. XIII, sec. 13).
54. The Federal Marriage Amendment (H.J. Res. 88) was introduced in 2006, but
failed to get the two-thirds approval in the House of Representatives necessary for a
federal constitutional amendment.
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perspective, with its emphasis on state constitutional space, illuminates
new aspects of federal constitutionalism. If it has done so, and if it has
encouraged further research in comparative sub-national
constitutionalism, then it has accomplished its purpose.
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